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This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of 
countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a 
general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three 
countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and 
enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the 
formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We 
propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual 
union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the ‘core’ countries’ interest 
to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-
up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion 
of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting 
illustration. 






Robertson Hall (PhD) 
Woodrow Wilson School 
Princeton University 





Draft: July 2007 
Prepared for the 2007 CESifo Venice Summer Institute “Reinventing Europe”. 
I would like to thank my advisors John Londregan and Andrew Moravcsik for their invaluable 
guidance as well as Adam Meirowitz, Thomas Romer, and Thomas Palfrey for their helpful 
comments and our useful discussions while at Princeton University. I have also greatly 
benefited from personal discussions with Paola Conconi, Abdul Noury, Micael Castanheira, 
André Sapir, Paul Magnette, and Pisani-Ferry while at ECARES/ULB and helpful feedback 
during my presentations at APSA 2006, MPSA 2007 and the ECARES/ULB Economics 
Seminar.   2
I. Introduction 
The recent proliferation and expansion of international cooperation agreements and 
institutionalized regimes has attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines. The 
ensuing shift in the locus of domestic and foreign policy formation to the supranational arena 
makes it all the more necessary to study the origins and evolutionary dynamics of these 
supranational structures from both an empirical and theoretical standpoint. Especially in the 
European context, it is of indisputable significance both from a scholarly and a policy-making 
perspective to make sense of the intricate map of international cooperation within an enlarged 
European Union of twenty-seven or more members. 
This paper introduces a formal game-theoretic framework elucidating various aspects of the 
variable geometry and the dynamics of international union formation with a focus on European 
integration. We wish to study questions about the coalitional dynamics of international union 
formation and piece-meal widening of a union. In a non-cooperative game of international union 
formation where the grand union is weakly efficient, why would we ever observe delay in the 
formation of the grand union? For example, why did formerly eligible countries like the UK, 
Denmark, Austria, and Sweden join the European Community at a much later time? Naturally, 
we are particularly interested in endogenous strategic considerations in the creation of a union by 
a core of countries rather than exogenous changes in the geopolitical and geoeconomic 
environment (which rendered for example newly democratized countries like Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal or former communist countries eligible candidates at some later stage of the union 
formation process). Countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal and the former communist 
Central-Eastern European countries were invited to join the existing Union soon after they 
became politically (i.e. democratic) and economically (i.e. liberalized market economies) 
eligible. These latter cases may be plausibly modeled by postulating exogenous (mainly 
geopolitical) constraints to entry that cease to bind at some point in time.  
Starting from the empirical observation of gradualism and piece-meal expansion of international 
unions and regimes (including to various degrees ASEAN, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and the 
African Union) in the absence of clearly perceived shocks to the global (or even regional)   3
geopolitical and economic system, we propose strategic delay in the supranational bargaining 
process as a theoretical explanation. International cooperation and regional integration 
agreements are usually initiated by a core of ‘natural’ partners, who wish to reap the immediate 
gains from cooperation. Hence, even without the formalization of arbitrary eligibility criteria, 
other aspirant members are at first effectively excluded from the ‘enacting’ coalition only to join 
later at more unfavorable institutional and policy terms. So even when the inclusion of a wider 
collectivity of states has always been Pareto efficient, the formation of the enlarged coalition is 
strategically delayed by the founding signatories for reasons to be explained. 
While the emphasis among international relations scholars has been primarily on the rationale for 
international cooperation agreements, their enforceability and their general effect on the conduct 
of international relations, this paper seeks to shift the focus to the evolution of member 
composition and institutional design of such regimes. Given the general consensus among 
political scientists and economists on the existence of ‘mutual gains’ in international cooperation 
– effectively amounting to a Pareto-improving response to international policy spillovers and 
externalities intrinsic within a globalized environment of interdependence –, the general 
arguments of the paper concentrate on the strategic calculus of surplus distribution in union 
formation taking efficiency considerations for granted
3. To that effect, we introduce a general 
class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games with N = 3 players, in order to allow for the 
possibility of subcoalitions and endogenous enlargement with strategic delay.   
To tackle some of the above questions we make use of positive political economy
4 models 
theorizing about the strategic interaction of states in the realm of international cooperation. The 
                                                 
3 In the background lie related normative questions on the institutional reform of the EU addressing the optimal 
allocation of responsibilities between supranational bodies and the member states. At the core of this ongoing debate 
on the optimal governance structure of the enlarged EU lies the trade-off between flexibility and commitment (see 
Dewatripont et al., 1995, Ch. 3). On one hand, the proliferation of diverse member-states and areas of cooperation 
intensifies the need for increased flexibility in the supranational decision-making processes and the structure of 
further integration, while, on the other hand, the expansion of the Union necessitates stronger constitutional 
commitment to the acquis communautaire in order to lock in the achieved gains of existing integration. The issue of 
institutional flexibility was partially addressed by the Treaty of Nice (signed in February 2001 and ratified in 
February 2003), which admittedly fell short of far-reaching institutional reform. The failure of the European 
Constitutional Convention indicates that the right balance between the two still remains elusive. 
4 Even though the methodology is primarily derived from economic models, the theory does not limit itself to 
strictly economic variables in explaining the coalitional dynamics of integration. It is flexible enough to 
accommodate non-economic explanations of integration, such as geopolitical considerations and ‘security 
externalities’ (see Gowa, 1994).   4
rise of supranationalism does not necessarily imply the decline of the nation-state, which is why 
we use the latter as the main unit of analysis. For the most part we treat countries as unitary 
actors and international unions as coalitions among states. Particularly prevalent within the 
realist tradition in international relations theory, the unitary actor assumption treats 
democratically elected governments as representative agents seeking to maximize the welfare of 
the average (or median in the unidimensional case) citizen or just some other aggregated national 
objective. Adding special interests and preference heterogeneity within countries gives rise to the 
possibility of strategic delegation and cross-country popular alliances and is more conducive to 
the ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ (Moravcsik, 1998) approach to regional integration and 
national preference formation. This nuanced analytical perspective is much more pervasive 
among economists in the political economy literature of regional integration (see for example 
Brou and Ruta, 2004). In the same vein, we talk about states not governments, thus abstracting 
away from micropolitical considerations of vote maximization; our macrorealist perspective is 
essentially predicated on the assumption of domestic political consensus with respect to a 
country’s perceived core national interests in the pursuit of international cooperation
5. In the bulk 
of the analysis, we choose to subsume these important micro-level questions of national 
preference formation within exogenous assumptions. Furthermore, we refrain from examining 
the actual sources of surplus gains of international cooperation (in any given area) for the main 
reason that the focus is on the coalitional and bargaining dynamics within the context of an 
international union. In essence, this is a theory of ‘grand bargains’ among states rather than an 
institutionalist account of the workings and policy-making functions of supranational bodies. The 
formal nature of the approach renders its results generalizable to other cases of gradual coalition 
formation among states in the pursuit of international cooperation. 
We offer one particular mechanism that can generate strategic delay in the formation of the 
grand union: private information over the synergistic benefits generated by unions of which a 
country is a member. According to the proposed theory, uncertainty over the exogenous coalition 
                                                 
5 Our case study on French EEC policy in the 60s analyzes for example the various policy shifts that took place 
despite the continuous dominant presence of Gaullists in power (initially General de Gaulle himself followed by his 
ideological heir and successor Pompidou). Of course, the assumption of continuity in economic and political 
integration policy across partisan lines is just an analytical simplification, not an empirical iron law. Gruber (2000), 
however, provides a theoretical explanation for the scant evidence of radical policy shifts with respect to decisions 
of accession to and/or secession from international regimes by ideologically distinct governments.   5
surplus may result in strategic delay through a separating signaling mechanism, whereby high 
types choose to initially participate in a smaller union in order to shape the terms of enlargement 
to their benefit. In other words, we interpret the bandwagoning phenomenon in union formation 
and expansion as a war of attrition game, whereby states place themselves temporally on the 
coalition-building process in an attempt to signal their resolve in waiting out the formation of the 
Pareto efficient grand union. In equilibrium, the proposal order affects the order of entry to the 
coalition, which in turn is a strong predictor of surplus allocation. 
The next section provides a brief review of the breadth and scope of the political science 
literature on international cooperation with a particular emphasis on European integration as well 
as an account of the positive political economy literature on international unions. The subsequent 
section consists of our spatial bargaining model of union formation examining uncertainty as a 
source of gradualism in union enlargement. By manner of empirical justification, we further 
proceed to show how our theory applies to the case of the first enlargement of the European and 
Economic Community, focusing in particular on the French-German-British triptych and the 
bargaining dynamics between those three major actors with respect to British accession to the 
EEC. The concluding section examines possible extensions, summarizes some of the 
implications of the model, and evaluates the merits of the utilized methodological techniques. 
 
 II.  Related  Literature 
The content and methodological approach of this paper draws from a variety of related work on 
both positive and normative aspects of international union formation and policy coordination and 
relates to diverse strands of literature in both economics and political science. It falls within the 
general field of positive political economy with an application to regional integration. 
The political science literature on international cooperation has been dominated by International 
Relations theorists of various traditions. The early debate on the theoretical and empirical 
relevance of supranational institutions was instigated by the neoliberal school of thought, giving   6
rise to large body of work collectively dubbed as regime theory (Keohane, 1984; Milner, 1997; 
Slaughter, 2004). Their focus on the ‘mutual gains’ rationale for international cooperation in an 
anarchic world came as a rebuttal to the Waltzian realist mantra of power politics and national 
interests, which deemed the emergence of supranational institutions as epiphenomenal to the 
existing balance of power and essentially inconsequential within the system of international 
relations. However, the acceleration of the European integration project and the proliferation of 
regional and global institutions in the 80s shifted the focus of the neorealist critique from the 
Pareto efficiency of international regimes (Krasner, 1983) onto the ‘relative gains’ of their 
participants and enforceability of those decentralized structures (Grieco, 1988 & 1990; 
Mearscheimer, 1994/5). Sharing a common rational choice methodological perspective, the 
emergence of a neoliberal-neorealist consensus on the importance, causes, and effects of 
supranationalism has gradually given way to the analysis of distributional considerations in the 
evolution and design of those institutions. Gruber (2000) for example views international 
regimes not simply as incomplete contracts or focal points in the selection of multiple equilibria 
of coordination (as ‘new institutionalists’ are more than apt to do), but essentially as the 
manifestation of ‘go-it-alone’ power by rational ‘enacting’ governments seeking to restrict the 
choice set of domestic opponents and peripheral states
6. He makes use of a power argument in 
order to explain the bandwagoning phenomenon of union widening as well as the stability of 
those supranational institutional arrangements. In a similar vein, the game-theoretic argument of 
this paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of union formation and 
expansion and of their institutional design. 
European integration studies
7 in particular have profited from extensive scholarly work from 
various fields of political science, albeit based on different disciplinary foundations and 
theorized at different levels of abstraction and generalizability (see Verdun, 2005). American 
accounts of European integration tend to be more interdisciplinary in nature and more deductive 
                                                 
6 Gruber (2000) is critical of the neoliberal-realist consensus on the Pareto efficiency of international regimes and is 
mostly interested in the winners vs. losers dimension of international cooperation, arguing that it is often the case 
(citing NAFTA and the European Monetary System as his primary examples) that some late signatory countries to 
such regimes are better off in an autarchic status quo ante of no cooperation than their current state of wider 
integration. However, the status quo ante has been removed from their choice set by the fait accomplit of partial 
integration, thereby rendering the costs of joining an existing international cooperation agreement lower than those 
of staying out. 
7 For a concise literature review of approaches to the study of European integration see Hix (1994; 1998).   7
from an epistemological point of view. Mostly influenced by IR/IPE theories of international 
cooperation, such as regime theory, American scholars tend to regard the European project as a 
particular example of an exceptionally institutionalized regime of international cooperation and a 
particular affirmation of generalized theories of union formation and regional integration. 
Europeans, on the other hand, take on the whole a more empirical, particularistic approach 
making ample use of the methodological techniques of comparative politics and public policy. 
They view the European Union as a sui generis supranational state-like entity and as a result are 
loathe to export the conclusions derived from empirical analyses of various areas of 
supranational policy-making to other less institutionalized international regimes (such as 
Mercosur, NAFTA, and ASEAN)
8. The stark difference between the two approaches lies in the 
fact that the former theorize about the European Union as an international regime, whilst the 
latter regard it as a peculiar political system combining various aspects of domestic statehood. 
This highlights the need for a multidisciplinary approach (political economy) to bridge the gap 
(Verdun, 2005) and to bring studies of European integration back to the mainstream of political 
science and out of their disciplinary insulation. 
Economists have of late forcefully entered the interdisciplinary field of integration studies by 
drawing on well-established theories in the fields of public and international economics. Highly 
influential in these models has been the public economics literature on fiscal federalism and 
decentralization (e.g. Oates, 1972 and 1999; Besley and Coate, 2003; Hafer and Landa, 2005; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1996a; Bureau and Champsaur, 1992; Cremer and Palfrey, 2000), which 
examines the welfare and distribution effects of federal and/or decentralized government 
structures on the provision of public goods. Economists also tend to focus on the political 
economy of macroeconomic international coordination as in the case of monetary integration 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1996b; Casella, 1992b) as well as regional redistribution (Bordignon et 
al., 2001; Casella, 2005; Lockwood, 2002). Closely related to the phenomenon of economic 
integration and drawing from the field of public finance is the theory of clubs and overlapping 
jurisdictions (Casella and Feinstein, 2002; Roberts, 1999), which models the interaction between 
                                                 
8 See Caporaso et al. (1997) for a conclusive debate on whether the European Union constitutes a unique case (or the 
N=1 debate).   8
markets as sets of rules for the exchange of private goods and institutions as organizations for the 
provision of public goods.  
The above theoretical bodies of work have recently spawned a fast-growing literature on the 
political economy of integration and international unions (e.g. Alesina et al., 2001 and 2005; 
Alesina and Spolaore, 2003; Baldwin, 1993; Bolton and Roland, 1997; Bordignon and Brusco, 
2001; Brou and Ruta, 2004; Ellingsen, 1998), which mainly consists of positive game-theoretic 
models of the economic incentives of integration and/or secession (on secession see Bordignon 
and Brusco, 2001) as well as the economic determinants of country and union size, often 
yielding normative conclusions on constitutional design
9. These papers take a non-generic 
approach to the specification of union benefits by modeling an international union as an efficient 
central provider of a public good, characterized by economies of scale and spillovers across 
union (and non-union) members, as in Alesina et al. (2001 and 2005). This modeling approach 
has been amply applied to explain the coalitional dynamics of European monetary integration 
and currency unions (Alesina and Grilli, 1993; Casella, 1992a) and to design the optimal 
membership rules to EMU - whether through rigid membership criteria or gradual expansion 
through flexible rules of integration (see Fratianni, 1998; Pisani-Ferry, 1995). On the basis of the 
theoretical results of these models, a number of economists have ventured to contribute to the 
ongoing debate about the institutional structure of the European Union (see for example Alesina 
and Wacziarg, 1999; Alesina and Perotti, 2004; Jacquemin and Sapir, 1995)
10. 
In contrast to Alesina et al.’s (2001, 2005) emphasis on the stability and size of equilibrium 
unions in light of public good spillovers, the focus of this paper is on the bargaining dynamics of 
the coalition formation game and the strategic incentives inherent in negotiating the formation of 
an international union of countries. In what follows, we analyze the case of a three-country 
regional setting through non-cooperative spatial models of bargaining, in order to gauge the 
extent to which the dynamic process of union formation can be explained by endogenous 
strategic factors, such as uncertainty. We essentially focus on the three-country case so as to 
                                                 
9 For a brief survey of economic theories of (dis)integration see Ruta (2005). 
10 The Center for Economic Policy Research issues yearly reports on various issues of European integration 
providing the opportunity for political economists to contribute to policy-making debates within the context of the 
European Union (see for example Berglöf et al., 2003 and Dewatripont et al., 1995). On the debate on uniformity vs. 
flexibility in the face of enlargement also see Scott and de Burca, 2000 and Steunenberg, 2002.   9
allow for the creation of subcoalitions and endogenous enlargement in the gradual formation of 
the grand coalition of countries.  
 
  III. Gradualism in a Signaling Game of Union Formation 
Our modeling approach consists of a combination of simple unidimensional spatial analysis 
together with non-cooperative games of coalition formation to model policy centralization within 
an international union (e.g. EU). The spatial approach is based on the interpretation of an 
international union (or regime) as a commitment device to coordinate policy across countries and 
is better suited to analyze the bargaining aspects of union formation and/or policy coordination 
compared to the public goods approach in the public economics literature of international unions. 
It also provides for a parsimonious formalization of the liberal intergovernmentalist (Moravcsik, 
1998) theory on the ‘grand bargains’ of EU treaties and/or international cooperation in distinct 
policy areas (e.g. EMU). The coalition formation approach, on the other hand, is permeated by 
the notion of international unions as coalitions among countries adopting a common 
supranational policy and institutional structure. The unidimensional policy variable may hence 
be construed as the ‘institutional terms of accession to a union’ or a supranational public good 
affecting the utility of coalition members (and even non-members allowing for externalities). 
The underlying cooperative game of coalition formation prescribes the set of players N (or in this 
case countries using the unitary actor assumption) as well as the value or worth  ℜ ∈ ) (c v  of each 
coalition of countries  N c ⊆ . The source of these exogenous coalition benefits or just ‘functional 
synergies’ is not explicitly modeled but is implicitly linked to the emerging economic and 
political interdependence among countries in the era of globalization. The pure public goods 
nature of these benefits renders them indivisible, while the unidimensional policy variable serves 
as an imperfect (because of insufficient dimensionality) allocation device of coalitional surplus. 
Hence, in this imperfect transferable utility model of international union formation, utilities are 
linear with respect to policy and exogenous indivisible benefits.    10
In these models we will generally employ a typical assumption used in the coalition formation 
literature, whereby the grand coalition is weakly efficient. This contingency is what we refer to 
as weak superadditivity in the underlying structure of the cooperative game, i.e. the total worth of 
the grand union is greater or equal to the sum of the worths of any constituent subunions or  –
prosaically put – the whole is better than the sum of its parts. Otherwise, it would be trivial to 
explain why the grand coalition doesn’t form or even impossible to explain the gradual 
formation of the grand coalition
11. Formally: 






c    c v N v , ) , ( ) ( , where π denotes any partition 
of the set of players N. 
In what follows, we explore a multilateral non-cooperative bargaining game over coalition 
formation and common union policy for the simple case of N = 3 countries. In this simple 
context, we examine the implications of private information over the size of the exogenous 
benefits for the potential of strategic delay in the formation of the grand coalition (i.e. whether 
coalition formation is gradual or immediate) and whether it actual forms or not. We use a 
common modeling framework that consists of a linear absolute deviation utility function and a 
dynamic bargaining protocol with equal recognition probabilities, thus shying away from risk 
aversion and inequality in agenda-setting power as possible sources of strategic delay. The use 
of a random recognition protocol is just an abstraction for more institutionalized enlargement 
negotiations, whereby an aspirant member may first have to receive candidate status by the 
existing members and then negotiate the exact terms of accession subject to unanimous approval. 
We generally restrict our attention to the bargaining equilibria that exhibit gradualism in the 
formation of the grand union of all three countries concerned. As it turn outs, gradualism by dint 
of strategic delay may only come about once the more recalcitrant of the founding members gets 
to propose first.  
Using the above parsimonious three-country setting, we wish to demonstrate how the existence 
of private information about the synergistic benefits of any given coalition can hamper political 
                                                 
11 Unlike earlier models in coalition theory, recent non-axiomatic work on coalition formation with externalities 
does not necessarily predict the emergence of the grand union (unlike the cooperative solution concepts of the core 
and the Shapely value).   11
compromise at an earlier date thus giving rise to inefficiencies in the bargaining process. So long 
as any country may not correctly anticipate the synergies inherent in a political union wherefrom 
it is excluded, equilibrium delay in the bargaining process essentially arises as a cost of 
extracting information about one’s marginal contribution to the grand coalition. Along these 
lines, any ideological demand over the ideological make-up of a proposed union is construed as a 
credible signal of how much a country stands to gain on the valence dimension from cooperating 
with any subset of its potential coalition partners. The model seeks to highlight the strategic 
trade-off between joining a political union as a founding member at less than favorable terms and 
waiting for a better accession deal at a later point in time that essentially permeates the dynamic 
process of European integration and expansion. The dynamic interaction between France, 
Germany, and the UK in the early days of the European Community constitutes the interesting 
case at hand and will be analyzed in the next section. 
We make use of a dynamic, two-period spatial bargaining model of coalition formation with 
private information over the joint ‘gains from trade’ intrinsic to any bilateral coalition of 
countries. Let  C B A i , , =  denote countries as unitary actors bargaining over the creation of 
unions at specific policy terms  X xc ∈ , where c represents any non-empty subset of 
} , , { C B A N = , i.e.  ∅ ∈ / 2
N c ,and  ℜ ⊆ X  denotes the single policy (or ideological) dimension 
over which bargaining takes place. To avoid confusion, we denote coalition structures C as 
2 }, /{ ) ( ≥ − c   c N x c c , where c denotes a bilateral or trilateral union with common policy xc,, 
otherwise  A/B/C denotes the fully autarchic coalition structure. We introduce preference 
heterogeneity over policy by assuming distinct country-specific ideal points on the line of real 
numbers  X m m m C B A ∈ < < , where the letter m denotes the bliss point of the median voter in 
the country. As long as any subsets of countries agree to coordinate on a common policy 
X xc ∈ , then each member of that coalition (or political union) reaps the common coalition 
benefits  ∅ ∈ ≥ / 2 , 0
N
c c y
12. Note that the assumption of weak superadditivity guarantees that 
N
c c c c y y 2 , ∈ ′ ⊆ ≤ ′ , i.e. the grand coalition ABC is weakly efficient and any bilateral union of 
                                                 
12 A political union is basically viewed as an economic club that yields excludable and indivisible common benefits, 
given that any such synergistic relationship between sovereign nation-states is embedded within a broader 
environment of economic interdependence through trade and exchange of people, ideas, and factors of production 
(which is the standard view of the engine of integration in post-WWII Western Europe).   12
countries may not generate strictly higher ‘gains from trade’. Moreover, we do not allow for any 
policy externalities across countries; hence, autarchy yields no exogenous benefits per se, i.e. 
C B A i yi , , , 0 = = . It remains the case that in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, autarchic policy 
coincides with the median ideal point in each country as a direct consequence of the Median 
Voter Theorem
13. To keep things simple, utility takes the linear absolute deviation form 
, ) ; ; ( c i c c c i y m x y x m U + − − =   C B A i c i , , , = ∈
14. 
We further postulate the following set of technical assumptions with respect to the worth of the 
grand coalition ABC and the spatial configuration of median ideal points (see figure 1): 
Assumption 1:  () ( ) [] A B B A B B C m m m m m m m − + − + ∈ 2 ,  
Assumption 2:  () A C
B A
C ABC A C m m
m m
m y m m − >
+





The first assumption essentially implies that preference-wise the ‘moderate’ country B is closer 
to A than C and thus A and B are the ‘natural’, ‘core’ partners in any pairwise coalition, while C 
is spatially peripheral to the other two. By ‘natural’ partners we wish to denote a subset of 
countries that lie closer in terms of institutional structures, historical traditions, and economic 
fundamentals, which all make up for enhanced ideological contiguity in terms of policy 
preferences
15. Moreover, according to assumption 2, the exogenous benefits associated with the 
grand union ABC are at such a level as to allow for meaningful policy negotiations over the 
ideological direction of the trilateral union but not high enough to make everyone’s participation 
constraints trivially binding. 
                                                 
13 Under autarchy, each country retains full sovereignty over the determination of its own domestic policy by 
democratic means. By the Median Voter Theorem, mi is the only Condorcet winner  in any pairwise election (or 
referendum). The no-coalition-externalities assumption implies that the autarchic, go-it-alone payoff of a country 
does not depend on the entire coalition structure, i.e. whether the other two players coalesce or not. See Maskin 
(2004) for an axiomatic extension of the Shapely value solution concept to allow for coalition externalities and 
partition functions.  
14 Note that by using this simple linear functional form we essentially assume risk-neutrality; therefore, risk aversion 
will not factor in our results. The common exogenous benefit of integration y essentially enters utility as an additive 
component that is orthogonal to the ideological policy dimension. This essentially represents the economies of scale 
property of the centralized provision of public goods within international unions. 
15 Ipso facto it is fair to argue that the founding members of the European Community for example (France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries) constituted ‘natural’ partners in the formation of the union.   13
 




In the model we introduce uncertainty by assuming that the representatives of each country i are 
only aware of the synergistic benefits generated by a union in which they participate, i.e. the 
members of any given union share private information over the worth of their coalition. 
Otherwise, any excluded partner holds uniform prior beliefs over the common benefits inherent 
in a potential union between the other two countries, i.e. for any country  j i k , ≠ , 
] , 0 [ ~ ABC k ij y U y , where  ABC y  denotes the total worth of the grand coalition. An equivalent 
interpretation of this type of private information is that the representative of any country k does 
not know with certainty the level of his/her country’s marginal contribution  j i k y y ij ABC , , ≠ −  to 
the grand coalition. 
As for the bargaining protocol of the game, we assume two successive rounds of negotiations, 
where each country representative is randomly recognized with equal probability in each period 
regardless of the existing coalition structure
16. Once recognized at time t = 0,1, the representative 
of country i makes an unconditional
17 union policy proposal  X x
i
t ∈ , which may be accepted or 
                                                 
16 We hence abstract away from the possibility that participation in a union at an earlier time enhances one’s 
proposal prerogative at subsequent enlargement negotiations, which could alternatively form the rationale for 
gradualism by incentivizing early participation by means of enhanced bargaining leverage in subsequent expansion 
negotiations. 
17 This is just a technical assumption that simplifies the conditional proposal strategy set to X rather than C × X as in 
the case of offers conditional on the proposed coalition c ∈ 2
N / ∅.  Note that in tandem with the majority of papers 
on coalition formation we only allow for conditional offers, i.e. proposals that get implemented if and only if all 
parties involved concur. Gomes (1999), on the other hand, teases out the implications of allowing for both 
X 
 mC   mB 
mC - yABC 
 mA 
mA + yABC 
  x ˆ    14
rejected by the other countries  i k j ≠ , . A political union with common policy  X x
i
t ∈  will form 
at time t only between the proposing country and those who accept that proposal. Existing union 
policy may only be renegotiated subject to the unanimous approval of all its members. We 
further assume excessively high fixed costs of union disintegration, effectively implying that 
once created a union partnership may not dissolve or equivalently that a union member may not 
unilaterally withdraw
18. An existing union may only expand its membership to the excluded 
country as long as all of the participating members agree to enlargement at the proposed policy 
terms
19. The postulate of veto power in enlargement negotiations is avowedly one of the driving 
forces of the main result. Finally, the future is discounted at a common rate  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ δ . 
Before we proceed to describe the equilibrium, we introduce our final piece of notation: 
Notation: Let  Ct=0, Ct=1 , where ∀ c ∈ Ct=0, c’ ∈ Ct=1, then c’ ⊄ c (no-union-
dissolution assumption), denote a two-period coalition-formation path.  
Definition 1: A coalition-formation path   Ct=0, Ct=1  is called comprehensive if 
and only if the grand coalition ABC forms in either period 0 or 1, otherwise the 
coalition-formation process is partial.  
Definition 2: A coalition-formation path  Ct=0, Ct=1  is called gradual if and only 
if ∃ c ∈ Ct=0, c’ ∈ Ct=1 such that c ⊂ c’. Otherwise, it is immediate
20. 
We focus on the separating perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this sequential bargaining 
game to demonstrate how gradualism in the formation of the grand union ABC may arise as a 
consequence of private information. Each country i’s first-period proposal 
i
t x  essentially 
                                                                                                                                                             
conditional and unconditional offers for efficiency and concludes that inefficient delay can be significant in 
superadditive games with small discount factors once unconditional offers have been ruled out.  
18 This assumption is closely related to Seidmann and Winter’s (1998) concept of irreversibility of coalition 
agreements, which once agreed upon become immediately enforced allowing the contracting parties to reap the 
related payoffs. Their implicit assumption is that the fixed costs of divesting a coalition agreement are so high that 
the latter becomes an enforceable outside option in the bargaining process. 
19 This assumption essentially reflects the unanimity requirement for EU enlargement. 
20 Seidmann and Winter (1998) offer an excellent theoretical account of the concepts of immediate vs. gradual as 
well as partial vs. comprehensive coalition formation.    15
functions as a signal of its type  ] , 0 [ ABC ij y y ∈  in a potential bilateral union agreement with 
another country j, which becomes tantamount to its resolve to wait out the formation of the 
grand union at more favorable policy terms. Taking country A for example, high  AB y  types will 
want to credibly signal their strong type by proposing a transitory bilateral AB subunion 
agreement at time 0, in order to achieve greater bargaining leverage in the subsequent policy 
negotiations at time t = 1 by entrenching their position within a beneficial status quo. In that 
case, the excluded party C will recognize that only high  AB y  types would find it in their interest 
to incur the cost (or reservation utility of partial coalition formation) of strategic delay in order to 
induce a better  ABC x  proposal at time t = 1
21. The more extreme (relative to C) of the ‘core’ 
countries, i.e. the one that has least to gain, will hold the enlargement process hostage, in order to 
achieve the best possible deal in the formation of the grand coalition ABC. We now proceed to 
formally demonstrate the workings of this signaling mechanism of strategic delay. 
Restricting our attention to the proposal strategy of country A, we first state the equilibrium and 
then go on to describe it: 
Proposition 3: There exists a perfect separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium, whereby 
the representative of country A will propose 
A
A m x =
0  in period 0 if and only if 
[] ABC AB y y y , ~ ∈  for some  [] ) ( 2 ), ( ~
A C ABC A B ABC m m y m m y y − − − − ∈ , in which case 
coalition AB will form right away and may later expand to the grand coalition ABC at 
time  t = 1 with strictly positive probability. Otherwise, for  [ ) y yAB
~ , 0 ∈ ,  A will 
propose  x x
A ˆ 0 =  such that C is just indifferent between accepting and rejecting at time 
t = 0, in which case the grand union ABC will form immediately (see figure 1). 
So for appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs, gradualism in union formation will ensue with 
positive probability for a non-degenerate support of high bilateral union types  y yAB
~ ≥ . 
Otherwise, country A finds it too costly to delay the immediate formation of the efficient grand 
coalition. 
                                                 
21 In close similarity to the Cho-Kreps criterion for equilibrium refinement, our sequential equilibrium is supported 
by appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be specified later on.   16
Solving this sequential bargaining game backwards, let us first examine the proposal subgame in 
period 1 given an existing coalition structure  C m AB A / ) ( . Depending on its type, once 
recognized the representative of country A will either move to propose his/her ideal point for 
high enough values of 
AB y  in order to preserve the existing status quo  C m AB A / ) ( , or otherwise 
will propose  ABC C y m − , which makes C’s participation constraint just binding, thus leading to 
the formation of  ) ( ABC C y m ABC −  as a final outcome. Formally, A’s optimal proposal strategy at 
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if C accepts too, otherwise he/she will only accept an amended status quo bilateral coalition AB 
such that  [ ] A B A AB
A m m m x x − ∈ = 2 , 1  conditional on C’s rejection. Finally, it is a weakly 
dominant strategy for C to accept any  [ ] ABC C ABC C
A y m y m x + − ∈ , 1  regardless of B’s response, 
i.e. regardless of whether the grand coalition actually materializes or not
22. 
Country B on the other hand will choose to move the status quo coalition structure if there is no 
grand coalition A will agree to, otherwise he/she will propose the grand coalition at the most 
favorable terms possible, subject to the approval of the other two negotiating parties. Hence, B’s 









− + − − − − ∈ − +
− − ∈
=
) ( ) ( , 0 ,
) ( ) ( 2 ), ( ,
/ ) ( ), ( 2 ,
*1
B A B ABC AB B
AB ABC A A C ABC A B ABC AB AB ABC A
A ABC A C ABC AB A
B
m ABC m m y y m
y y m ABC m m y m m y y y y m
C m AB y m m y y m
x
 
                                                 
22 Note that in order to ensure that the proposed equilibrium in pure strategies actually exists, we need that any 
country will accept a given proposal if indifferent between accepting and rejecting. We also make the tie-breaking 
assumption that any country will always vote for the larger coalition if indifferent between coalitions of different 
sizes.   17
Finally, once recognized the representative of country C, which was excluded from the initial 
union at time t = 0, will seek to maximize its expected returns from participating in the grand 
coalition ABC based on its beliefs about its marginal contribution  AB ABC y y − . According to the 
proposed separating equilibrium, C’s updated Bayesian beliefs following 
A
A m x =
1  will be such 
that  [] ABC C AB y y U y , ~ ~ ; therefore, an optimal proposal strategy for C would be to make A (the 
ideologically more extreme of the original union members relative to C’s position) just 
indifferent between coalition structures  ) ( ABC C y m ABC −  and   C m AB A / ) (  in expectation, i.e. 
[]
[ ] () ( ) { }
[]
[] () ( ) {}
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, ~ ~ \ max arg
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C’s proposal at time t = 1, thus giving C its autarchic equilibrium utility of 0 and essentially 
leading to the ex post inefficient outcome of partial coalition formation. 
Now let the coalition structure at time t = 1 be A/B/C, namely the full autarchic status quo. The 
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Finally, once the grand coalition has formed in the first period, its common policy may only be 
amended at time t = 1 if and only if  ] , [ C A ABC m m x ∉ , i.e. its existing common policy lies outside 
of the unanimity core. 
Reasoning backwards to the bargaining game in period 0, there are only two uniform support 
intervals of types  AB y  that country A may credibly signal to country C  in a separating 
equilibrium: low types  [ ) y yAB
~ , 0 ∈ , who will want to participate in the efficient union ABC as 
soon as possible, and high types  [ ] ABC AB y y y , ~ ∈ , whose transitory reservation utility in a 
gradualist equilibrium is high enough to justify strategic delay with the aim of eliciting a more 
favorable policy proposal from C  at t = 1. Hence, there are only two credible common policy 
proposals  X x
A ∈ 0  in equilibrium at t  = 0: high types in favor of gradualism will seek to 
maximize their transitory reservation utility stemming from a subcoalition AB by proposing their 
ideal point  
A m , which country B will unconditionally accept regardless of C’s response, while C 
will obviously reject in favor of setting its own autarchic policy. Low compromising types, on 
the other hand, will immediately propose a common policy  [] B ABC C
A m y m x x , ) ( ˆ 0 − ∈ = δ
23 
(depending on δ), such that C would be just willing to join the grand coalition ABC right away, 
instead of waiting for a potentially more favorable deal at a later time, i.e. 






t B ABC C
A \ \ ; , min ) ( ˆ 0 0 0 0 = = = − ∈ = δ , 
where  V’s denote period-0 continuation values. There exists a first-period common policy 
proposal  [] B ABC C m y m x , ) ( ~ − ∈ δ
24 such that for  ) ( ~
0 δ x x
A <  there exists a positive support of low 
y yAB
~ <  types that will reject C’s optimal period-1 proposal given its updated beliefs, i.e. 
                                                 
23 It is clear from the above analysis that  ABC C y m x − ≥ ) ( ˆ δ , otherwise for 
ABC C A y m x m − < ≤ ) ( ˆ δ  C would never 
want to participate in a grand union ABC whose ideological make-up is so far skewed to the left that it yields less 
than its reservation utility of 0 throughout both periods, since it would not be able to amend it at time t  = 1. 
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implies that C’s rejection continuation value is quadratic, while for  ) ( ~
0 δ x x







C C x m
x
+
= , which implies that C’s rejection continuation value becomes linear. So, 
in effect, the location of  ) ( ˆ δ x  with respect to  ) ( ~ δ x  will depend on the value of the discount 
factor  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ δ . See figure 2 below for a graphical demonstration: 
 
Figure 2: Graphical Determination of  ) ( ˆ δ x  
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In order to derive the above expression for  y ~, we make use of the optimal proposal and 
acceptance strategies in the period 1 subgames analyzed above and also of the fact that the 






C A C − +
=  with 
certainty. Also note that each period 1 subgame equilibrium utility is discounted by a factor  3
δ  
reflecting temporal discounting and equal recognition probabilities. Given the spatial location of 
[]
B ABC C m y m x , ˆ − ∈  derived above, it is fairly straightforward to confirm that the cutoff type  y ~ 
indeed lies within the support interval [ ] ) ( 2 ), (
A C ABC A B ABC m m y m m y − − − − . 
In order to complete the characterization of the separating equilibrium starting with the 
representative of country A as the first-period proposer, we also need to specify the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs for C. So let 
() [ ) [ ) ( )
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+∞ ∪ − ∈
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AB C y m m m x   for y y U y
x x y m x   for y U y
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0 σ , 
where  () ⋅
C σ  denotes C’s updated beliefs about A and B’s reservation utility in the second 
bargaining round. In order to support A’s equilibrium Bayesian proposal strategy, C will reason 
that only non-compromising, high types would ever make an initial policy proposal outside of 
C’s grand coalition acceptance interval, i.e. strictly less than 
ABC C y m − , since C would never   21
accept such a proposal regardless of B’s response
25. On the other hand, only compromising, low 
types seeking the immediate formation of the grand coalition would make an offer within that 
interval. Given that the above line of reasoning would be common knowledge, A’s prescribed 
strategy would indeed be optimal in equilibrium.  
As it turn outs, in light of our assumptions on the efficiency of the grand coalition and the 
ideological configuration of the three players, the gradualist equilibrium of strategic delay may 
only come about once the more recalcitrant of the ‘natural partners’ gets to propose first. In 
essence, the agenda-setting power of the ‘natural’ or ‘core’ partners is not imposed ex ante as an 
exogenous prerogative but is rather rationalized de facto through the gradualist equilibrium of 
the model. In other words, the proposal order determines the order of entry into the union, which 
is crucial with respect to the endogenous formation of its ideological character and the ensuing 
allocation of its overall synergistic benefits. 
Having explained how gradualism may arise within the context of a separating perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, it is now incumbent to examine the efficiency properties of this equilibrium. From 
an  interim efficiency perspective, the question arises whether there is an immediate grand 
coalition formation path  ) ( ), ( ABC ABC x ABC x ABC  that makes everyone better off in comparison 
with the gradualist separating equilibrium path for high 
AB y  types, i.e. 
)) * ( ( , / ) ( 1
i
A x E ABC C m AB . 
Proposition 4: For a non-degenerate support of high 
AB y  types [ ] 0 , ~ , ~ > + ε ε y y , there 
exists an immediate grand coalition formation policy  [ ]
B ABC C ABC m y m x ,
* − ∈  such that 
)) * ( ( , / ) ( ) ( ), ( 1
* * i
A i ABC ABC x E ABC C m AB R x ABC x ABC  for all  C B A i , , = , where 
i R  denotes the weak preference relation. 
                                                 
25 Note that, despite the fact that country B shares the same private information as A, we have omitted its response to 
A’s t = 0 proposal from the signaling mechanism, taking its acceptance for granted. In light of its ‘moderate’ 
ideological position on the real line vis-à-vis the other two actors, the representative of country B would always 
accept a compromising grand union proposal  x x
A ˆ
0 = . However, it would only accept the gradualist equilibrium 
proposal 
A
A m x =
0  for 
C m  high enough and/or δ  low enough, in which case its initial acceptance strategy does not 
provide an informative signal to C. Otherwise, however, A would have to moderate its initial, gradualist proposal to 
the extent that B is just indifferent between  ) ( , / ) ( 0 ABC
A x ABC C x AB  and  ) ( , / /
ABC x ABC C B A .   22
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Ex post inefficiency, on the other hand, ensues whenever C’s 
C x 1 *  proposal gets rejected by A at 
t = 1, namely whenever the grand union ABC fails to materialize and the coalition formation 
process gets stalled in the partial coalition stage. In light of C’s non-degenerate beliefs about its 
partners’ reservation utility, there is always a positive support of high types that will reject its 
period-1 proposal and, hence, the partial union AB will fail to expand, in spite of the existence of 
mutually beneficial enlargement policy deals. Note that in the absence of uncertainty about one’s 
marginal contribution to the grand coalition worth, the unique equilibrium solution to the above 
two-period spatial bargaining game would prescribe immediate and comprehensive coalition 
formation and as such would necessarily be efficient. In other words, partial and/or gradual 
coalition formation paths in this model constitute sources of inefficiency. 
Finally, it would be interesting to conjecture how the bargaining outcomes of the above model 
would be affected by successive enlargement negotiations. What happens when there is an 
exogenous increase in the pool of eligible expansion countries? An increase in the size of an 
existing union would seem to have a dual effect on the negotiated ‘terms of accession’ vis-à-vis 
the excluded candidates-in-waiting: 1) it would enhance the collective agenda-setting power of 
the union, since its members would have to negotiate and consent to enlargement en bloc and 2) 
it would mitigate the degree of uncertainty with regards to each candidate country’s marginal 
contribution to collective welfare. The more entrenched and institutionalized an existing union is, 
the easier it is to gauge the potential effect of a new member on its collective synergies and 
policy orientation. For example, the strategic calculus and cost-benefit analysis inherent in the 
Southern and Eastern expansions of the European Community was much more clear-cut as 
compared to the first enlargement. This helps explain why the strict conditionality clauses 
imposed on the latest accession countries appeared as unduly harsh and unfavorable, even though 
these countries were much better off joining the EU than staying out (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 
2003). Our model may thus provide a theoretical analysis of the gradual shift in the EU 
enlargement process from open-ended accession negotiations (as evidenced in the earlier waves 
of enlargement) to the more rigorous application of the conditionality principle (most notable in   23




  V. Case Study: UK Accession to the EEC 
The early evolution of the membership and institutional set-up of the European Economic 
Community provides an interesting illustration of the above mechanism of strategic delay in 
union formation. Brought to life by the Treaty of Rome (signed and ratified by the founding 
members, namely France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in 1957), 
the European Economic Community was a belated offspring of the European Coal and Steel and 
Community (created by the Schuman Plan and the Treaty of Paris in 1950
27). The initial 
exclusion of the UK from the EEC led to the de facto division of Western Europe and gave rise 
to the core grouping of ‘the Six’ (also known as ‘Little Europe’). On account of its heavy 
reliance upon its transatlantic and Commonwealth trade links, Britain did not show any interest 
in participating in such a novel economic and political integration project, especially if it had to 
cede much of its highly valued sovereignty over sensitive domestic policy areas. In the eyes of 
the British political establishment, the incipient EEC was a fragile and highly uncertain political 
experiment that could prove entirely unsuccessful and lead to the imminent collapse of the 
established supranational institutions. All the more reason for British abstention from the Treaty 
of Rome was the strong agenda-setting influence of the French on the institutional and political 
character of this new structure. Imbued by a high degree of supranationalism and bureaucratic 
dirigisme – a direct heir of the Monnet blueprint on the ECSC High Authority -, the EEC was 
both in character and design much more than an economic free trade association. As a 
                                                 
26 Reluctance (or inability) on the part of candidate-members to pledge full adherence to the existing acquis points to 
the adoption of more flexible models of enlargement in the future by manner of ‘privileged partnership’ agreements 
and a more inclusive European Neighborhood Policy (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm). Quoting 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn in his recent speech at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (27
th 
October, 2006): “By keeping our word and sticking firmly to the accession perspective, we can create a virtuous 
circle of credible commitment, rigorous conditionality and reinforced reforms.”  
27 In an application of their theoretical model of gradual coalition formation, Seidmann and Winter (1998) interpret 
the Treaty of Paris as an irreversible action on the part of France and Germany and as part of a gradual coalition 
formation process.  
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concession primarily to the French, the Treaty of Rome, whose main agenda comprised the 
completion of the common market and subsequently the integration of agricultural markets, also 
allowed for the possibility of international cooperation in both the political and social spheres. 
As a result, the British perceived their national interests and preferences to lie elsewhere; in 
pursuit of an export outlet for their industrial production, they opted instead for the looser 
economic grouping of the European Free Trade Association (signed into existence by the 
Stockholm Convention in 1959)
28, whose economically diverse and geographically scattered 
membership also included Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal. The 
EEC, however, remained according to the Treaty of Rome open to all Western European 
countries, subject to certain political eligibility requirements (i.e. no dictatorships) and as long as 
they fully accepted the acquis communautaire
29.  
The first few years after the inception of the EEC, also known as the ‘honeymoon years’ (see 
Ludlow, 1997, pp. 22-26), were marked by great success and dynamism in the creation of the 
common market and the dismantlement of intra-EEC barriers to trade, which in turn sent a clear 
signal of high ‘mutual gains’ among the founding members and strong interest in the 
continuation and expansion of cooperation. That signal combined with a gradual shift in its trade 
patterns towards the major economies of the EEC (and away from its Commonwealth partners) 
led to a radical change in British policy towards Europe under the Conservative Macmillan 
government. As a result, the UK (together with Denmark, Ireland, and Norway) applied for EEC 
membership in 1961. 
The extensive negotiations that followed between the EEC-6 and the new candidates focused on 
i) the harmonization of their domestic legislation with the extensive body of EEC legislation 
(collectively known as the acquis communautaire) through derogations and transitional periods, 
ii) their political weight in the supranational institutions, and iii) their financial contributions to 
the common budget. While the Dutch were the staunchest supporters of UK accession (given 
their strong political and economic links with the British), four of the other EEC members were 
also in favor each for its own reasons (see Ludlow, 2006, Ch. 6). Only the French appeared 
                                                 
28 See Gstöhl, 2002 for an analysis of EC-EFTA relations. 
29 It should be noted that the Treaty of Rome did not specify any particular bargaining protocol for future accession 
negotiations other than that any enlargement decisions need to be agreed upon by unanimity (under Art. 237).   25
lukewarm towards the prospect of EEC enlargement (especially in the case of Britain), albeit not 
opposed to it in principle. They therefore presented the British with the biggest obstacles towards 
membership. Lest the negotiations be brought to a successful conclusion, General de Gaulle 
pronounced an effective veto upon British accession in a famous January 1963 press 
conference
30, in an attempt to preempt a potential Yes or No decision with respect to a fully 
negotiated but undesirable from the French point of view accession deal. 
De Gaulle’s unilateral and sudden decision to end accession negotiations by pronouncing 
‘Britain not ready for Europe’ came to the chagrin of the ‘Five’ other EEC members and initially 
caused some disenchantment and malaise in the everyday workings of the Community, 
effectively slowing down the pace of integration. Even the Germans, who under Adenauer 
placed high political stakes in a French-German rapprochement
31 but were also eager to 
welcome a major trading partner and militarily powerful country like Britain into the 
Community, were negatively surprised by de Gaulle’s actions; yet, apart from some ireful 
statements by politicians like Schroeder and Erhard, they chose not to confront France on the 
issue lest they jeopardize the heretofore achieved gains from cooperation and destabilize the 
internal institutional bargain of the EEC. Despite strong reactions by politicians of the other 
member-states, not one country chose to instigate the dissolution of the Community in light of 
the high economic and political stakes at hand. A similar episode took place in 1967 during the 
second British application for EEC accession under Wilson’s Labor government, only this time 
the official excuse for de Gaulle’s veto was the monetary instability of the sterling in light of its 
devaluation in 1967 (see Ludlow, 2006, Ch. 5). However, in the aftermath of the second French 
veto, peace, unity, and integration momentum were unlikely to return to the Community until the 
enlargement controversy (also known as la question anglaise) had been addressed in a manner 
satisfactory to both applicants and member states. 
                                                 
30 Here is a translated excerpt from his press conference as quoted in Ludlow, 1997, p. 207: “England is, indeed, 
insular and maritime, linked by her trade, her markets and her food supplies to diverse and often far-flung countries. 
She works primarily in industry and commerce, and hardly at all in agriculture. She has, in all her patterns of work, 
habits and traditions [,] which are highly distinctive and original. ¶ In short, the nature, the structure, the economic 
situation that characterize England, differ profoundly from the Continent. ¶ How then could England, as she lives, as 
she produces, as she trades, be incorporated into the Common Market as it was conceived and as it works?” 
31 As evidenced by the signing of the bilateral Elysée Treaty shortly after de Gaulle’s press conference in January 
1963, which remains until today a strong symbol of French-German rapprochement  in the 60s.   26
Enlargement negotiations were finally reopened in the Hague Summit of 1969, were concluded 
in 1971, and the UK, Denmark, and Ireland officially became the first EEC expansion members 
in 1973 (Norway’s accession was rejected by popular referendum). The French under their newly 
elected Gaullist president Georges Pompidou – but with the express approval of his predecessor 
and ideological kinsman de Gaulle – appeared much more accommodating during the 
enlargement process, having simultaneously achieved some much desired progress on the 
completion of the Community’s initial agenda (achèvement) and the deepening of cooperation 
into new policy areas (approfondissement). The British, on the other hand, got a much worse 
deal than they would have in 1963, as it became apparent that the onus of adaptation to the 
acquis lay with the states wishing to join the EEC, in light of the complexity of existing internal 
policy bargains. In the context of our models, this bargaining outcome translates into a policy 
further away from the expansion country’s ideal point
32. 
The French vetoes of the British bids for EEC membership in the 60s
33 provide an interesting 
illustration of the above model, where France would be country A, Germany would be country B, 
and the UK would be the expansion country C. We choose to restrict our attention to this triptych 
of actors because of their major role in the bargaining dynamics of the first enlargement. Firmly 
grounded on a rational choice perspective, one may interpret the above historical account 
through the theoretical prism of strategic delay in the formation of the EEC-9.  Accordingly, de 
Gaulle wanted to make sure that 1) the customs union and its common external tariff had been 
completed subject to the timetable set out by the Treaty of Rome, 2) the Common Agricultural 
Policy and its financial regulation framework became a fait accomplit, and 3) the institutional 
make-up of the union strongly reflected French interests, before he would agree to enter into 
membership negotiations with Britain (see Moravcsik, 1998, Ch. 3). France was apprehensive 
that premature British accession would derail the ongoing common market integration process, 
lead to the renegotiation of the CAP (through the formation of a strong British-German pro-
                                                 
32 Even though the acquis needs to be fully accepted and implemented by all new Community members, the single 
policy bargaining dimension in our models is just a metaphor for the ‘terms of accession’ or, in other words, how 
flexible the expansion country’s adjustment is to an existing body of legislation (e.g. through derogation clauses and 
transitional periods). That is why accession to an already formed and institutionalized union is not treated as a 
dichotomous decision to fully accept or reject the acquis as it is. Another way to rationalize the unidimensionality of 
the enlargement bargaining process is that it captures the afforded degree of an accession country’s influence upon 
the character and institutional design of the enlarged union. 
33 See N. Piers Ludlow (1997) for a detailed analysis of the relationship between the UK and the EEC in the 60s.   27
industrial axis), and on the whole alter the character of the EEC integration project towards a 
looser Atlanticist free trade area
34.  
The British on the other hand underestimated the political and economic stakes of existing 
members in the preservation of the Community as well as their resolve to adhere to the general 
principles of the acquis. When they eventually came to realize how much they had to gain or by 
corollary how little the French would benefit from enlargement, they softened their bargaining 
stance and agreed to much more onerous accession terms. This can avowedly not be a story of 
partisan re-orientation of the country, since 1) British accession negotiations were concluded 
under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, who was also the Lord Privy Seal or main 
negotiator during the 1961-3 period, and 2) a general cross-partisan consensus came about in 
Britain in the mid 60s with regards to the desirability of entry into the EU. To summarize, a way 
to explain this dynamic through a rational-choice framework is by arguing that the French 
reluctance to expand the union in the 60s was simply an attempt to signal its high resolve and 
contentment with the EEC-6 status quo. Gradualism in this vein may be construed as a strategic 
ploy in an uncertain environment of overlapping interdependencies with the aim of tilting future 
expansion negotiations in the founding members’ favor. The clash between France and Britain in 
this instance became even more pronounced because of their diametrically opposed preferences 
over the ideological orientation of European integration and structurally distinct commercial 
interests. 
Although the perception of French and British national interests by de Gaulle and Macmillan 
respectively may also be viewed through the prism of the wider geopolitical environment at the 
time (as many historians are apt to do
35), strategic political economy factors (coupled with 
domestic political considerations) do certainly come into play in examining the dynamics of 
enlargement. Even though geopolitical incentives loomed in the background in the form of 
                                                 
34 The following quote (Ludlow, 2006, p. 138) by General de Gaulle is quite indicative on this point: “Either it will 
have to be recognized that their [the British] entry into the Common Market, with all the exceptions that would 
inevitably accompany it, with all the quantitative and qualitative changes that it would entail, and with the 
participation of multiple other states that would certainly be its corollary, would amount to the establishment of an 
entirely new entity, all but erasing that which has been built. And where, then, would this lead us other perhaps than 
the creation of a type of European free trade area, which would in turn lead to an Atlantic zone that would deprive 
our continent of any real personality.” 
35 See for example Vaïsse, 1998; de la Serre, 1992.   28
‘security externalities’ (Gowa, 1994), the primary strategic considerations driving the integration 
and enlargement process were essentially economic, especially given that attempts towards 
political integration and security cooperation had not yet come to fruition following the failure of 
the Fouchet Plan in the early 60s. De Gaulle’s European policy was not dictated by illusions of 
grandeur or crude geopolitical considerations (Moravcsik, 2000); his perception of a ‘European 
Europe’ was above all of an economic nature and his primary concern was the promotion of 
shared commercial interests. It is within the above historical context that our political economy 
story of gradualism becomes germane. 
 
  IV. Discussion and Extensions 
The above theoretical framework provides an explanation for the paradox of union expansion to 
formerly eligible countries (UK, Scandinavian countries, Austria) or in other words piece-meal 
coalition formation in the absence of binding exogenous (e.g. geostrategic) constraints. We have 
managed to derive equilibrium delay in the formation of the grand union through the postulate of 
private information. Another way to view this model is that it makes gains from trade increasing 
over time and assumes the change of union policy increasingly expensive in terms of high fixed 
costs of bureaucratic and economic infrastructure (lock-in effect). This effectively amounts to an 
infant-industry special interests argument of systematically shifting preferences over time that 
give rise to dynamically expanding bargaining policy winsets.  
Tampering with the dimensionality and the information structure of these models suggests one of 
the ways to proceed in making these models richer, more comprehensive, and more realistic, by 
obviating the need for complex exogenous assumptions. Given the broad, non-issue specific 
nature of political unions, it seems more than plausible to assume more than one policy 
dimensions in the negotiation process, thus giving rise to opportunities for issue-trading, issue 
linkages, as well as enhanced cooperation in the form of policy-specific subunions. Adding a 
second policy dimension or public good opens up a range of possibilities with regards to the 
equilibrium relationship between union size and scope and the optimal rules of union formation.   29
This extension to the N = 3 union formation model allowing for a two-dimensional policy space 
should accordingly examine whether the separability of the policy dimensions has any significant 
welfare implications. An efficiency comparison of the bargaining equilibria of various schemes 
of union formation, such as federal package deals, enhanced cooperation, and open 
partnerships
36 could be potentially quite enlightening about the future of the European project. 
Alesina et al. (2001, 2005) use a public goods approach to predict a bias towards excessive 
centralization and small union size owing to a time-inconsistency problem. However, the 
historical record of European integration particularly in the 90s has shown that union expansion 
may be concomitant with deepening under the appropriate rules. In this extension to the model 
with multiple policy jurisdictions or public goods, it seems appropriate to examine how the 
coalition formation protocol affects the equilibrium relationship between size and scope. A 
multidimensional union formation model with externalities would be able to highlight the 
various incentives of countries to free-ride or otherwise bandwagon upon international initiatives 
and regimes. 
One related avenue for future research would be to explore a dynamic model of enlargement and 
union deepening, whereby piece-meal integration helps current and prospective members refine 
and signal their beliefs about the common uncertain benefits of integration through a number of 
random sample draws proportional to the degree of integration. Subunions (or enhanced 
cooperation agreements) could serve as policy laboratories experimenting on the actual effects 
of policy coordination in particular areas subject to highly variable exogenous shocks. Moreover, 
it would be interesting to model uncertainty about the size of union benefits (or else the resolve 
of ‘core’ countries to wait before they invite the peripheral country for negotiations) as a 
continuous-time war of attrition game with uncertainty (see for example Admati and Perry, 
1987; Cramton, 1992), in order to derive strategic delay through a perfect separation of types. 
                                                 
36 Models of variable geometry, such as the concentric circles approach proposed by Karl Lamers and the eccentric 
circles approach proposed by Edouard Balladur, essentially distinguish between a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ of 
countries integrating over overlapping and non-overlapping jurisdictions and subunions. In addition, generalized 
subsidiarity and open partnerships, a model of flexible integration put forward by Dewatripont et al. (1995), 
advocates the need for commitment to a common base of integration, allowing at the same time for discretion on the 
part of member-states to experiment and engage in optional new forms of cooperation in other policy areas.   30
Finally, in light of the economic and political interdependence of otherwise sovereign states, it 
would also be instructive for our purposes to allow for policy externalities or spillovers (positive 
or negative), whereby the welfare of the autarchic country is affected by the common policy 
adopted by the bilateral union, within these types of bargaining settings. It should be expected 
that the presence of externalities would affect equilibrium payoff allocations and coalition 
formation paths
37.  
To conclude, we will briefly evaluate the modeling techniques used in explaining the process of 
regional integration. The spatial bargaining model is based on the interpretation of an 
international union (or regime) as a commitment device to coordinate policy across countries in 
an efficient manner. This approach is better suited to analyze the bargaining aspect of union 
formation by emphasizing the policy trade-offs and bargains inherent in a positive-sum game 
among countries seeking to capture the surplus gains of supranational policy coordination. This 
non-cooperative game-theoretic approach is also amenable to illustrative extensive-form 
representations of the process of international cooperation and popular ratification. It may thus 
be construed as an attempt to formalize the tenets of the liberal intergovernmentalist theory 
(Moravcsik, 1998) of European integration and to capture the concept of nested two-level games 
(Putnam, 1988) in a game-theoretic manner through the incorporation of domestic political 
constraints in the popular ratification of intergovernmental treaties. Spatial analysis is flexible 
enough to be adequately applied to the explanation of both the ‘grand bargains’ of EU treaty 
negotiations as well as international cooperation in distinct policy areas that do not fall within the 
realm of ‘high politics’.  
However, parsimonious and versatile as they may be, spatial bargaining models can become 
quite laborious and inconclusive in more than one dimensions. In the absence of a restrictive 
notion of equilibrium stability, it appears excessively complex to extend the results to higher 
dimensions and thus to draw conclusions about the endogenous choice of policy areas of 
centralization (namely the scope of the union). Furthermore, the complexity of these models 
grows exponentially as one increases the number of countries; hence, they are not amenable to 
                                                 
37 Etro (2001) has analyzed the model with three countries and spillovers of international policy coordination and 
has found that if union policy is characterized by strategic complementarities then the grand union is much more 
likely to form than in the case of strategic substitutabilities.   31
N-country generalizations. Finally, there are reasons to be critical of the arbitrariness of the 
exogenous assumptions on the sequential bargaining structure and to be doubtful of the 
robustness of the results with respect to those assumptions
38, a common critique of non-
cooperative bargaining models. 
  
Appendix 
Proposition 4:  For a non-degenerate support of high 
AB y  types [ ] 0 , ~ , ~ > + ε ε y y , there exists an 
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Proof: Let  [] 0 , ~ , ~ > + ∈ ε ε y y yAB . We first need to find the set of grand union policies that make A 
weakly better off in an immediate coalition formation path rather than a gradualist one, i.e. find 
A ABC m x ≥  such that 
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Given that  ( ) A C ABC m m y y − − ≤ 2 ~ , it turns out that  ABC C ABC y m x − ≥ , which implies that there may 
be such an immediate grand coalition proposal that could make C weakly better off. Since B, the 
moderate country, will trivially have a strict preference to participate in an immediate grand union with a 
                                                 
38 See Sutton (1986) for an overview of these problems.   32
common policy much closer to its own ideal point, all we need to show is that C is weakly better off 
under such an immediate agreement compared to the gradualist equilibrium whereby it believes A and B 
to be of a high type, i.e. 
() () ()
() A C ABC AB
ABC C
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Since we know from before that  ( ) A C ABC m m y y − − ≤ 2 ~ , then the latter expression has to be true for 
0 ≥ ε  and will hold as a strict inequality for an interior cutoff type  y ~. We have thus shown that an 
immediate  grand coalition formation path under  ABC x  will be a Pareto superior solution, hence the   
interim inefficiency of the gradualist equilibrium. QED 
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